Investment in electricity networks, as regulated natural monopolies, is among the highest regulatory and energy policy priorities. Given the large scale of required investments in the coming years, impelled by the need for decarbonising the electricity sector, identifying investment drivers of power networks facilitates effective regulatory treatment of investment under incentive regulation. This study analyses the determinants of investment in Norwegian electricity distribution networks using a panel dataset of 126 companies from 2004 to 2010. A Bayesian Model Averaging approach is used to provide a robust statistical inference by taking into account the uncertainties around model selection and estimation. The results show that five factors drive nearly all network investments: depreciation, number of network stations, energy density, cost of energy not supplied, and number of leisure homes. Among these, depreciation plays the most important role regardless of the choice of prior. The study finds no evidence of impact on investments by weather and geographic factors which might be due to small variations of these factors across the country. Finally, distributed generations show no effect on investments reflecting the fact that Norwegian distribution networks are already adapted to connect many dispersed small scale hydroelectric resources. 
Introduction
The electricity networks are capital intensive industries which exhibit natural monopoly characteristics and are therefore subject to economic regulation. In recent years, the need for network expansion, integration of renewable energy resources, enabling demand side participation, and adoption of new technologies such as deployment of smart meters and smart grids has necessitated significant amount of investments in the grid. This has placed the issue of network investment at the core of recent energy policies and regulations in the power sector. The objective is to ensure sufficient investment in maintaining and modernising the grid and at the same time avoiding inefficiency in capital expenditures and protect end-users against high electricity prices. This is because nearly one-third of final electricity prices are related to distribution and transmission network charges (Pollitt and Bialek, 2008 ) and investments will increase consumer bills.
Investments in electricity networks, as regulated natural monopolies, are not driven by market signals where decisions are based upon the expected returns being higher than the incurred cost of capital. Instead, investments in networks respond to the regulatory framework and institutional constraints (Vogelsang, 2002; Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996) . Thus, achieving sufficiency and efficiency in capital spending depends on how the regulatory framework treats investments.
The challenge is whether new regulation models can be designed that provides effective incentives for delivery of quality of services while reassuring investors of the profitability of economically justified investments (Newbery, 2004) . The advantages of an effective regulatory framework include lower network cost, quality of service improvement, support of competitive wholesale and retail electricity market and encouraging investments to address the changes in supply and demand for network services (Joskow, 2008) . As a consequence, understanding the main drivers of investments can help regulators make better projection of required capital costs and more effectively tackle the issue of investments under incentive regulation.
Despite the importance of investments in regulated industries, the empirical literature on the issue is rather finite. Also, little effort has been made to analyse and systematically identify determinants of investments in electricity networks. This study investigates the key factors that drive the amount and direction of the investments in electricity distribution networks through a case study of the Norwegian network utilities. The next section discusses the issue of investment treatment under different regulatory regimes and briefly reviews the Norwegian regulatory framework. Section 3 presents our methodology which is based on Bayesian Model Averaging technique. Section 4 discusses the data used. The results and discussion of major findings are presented in Section 5. Section 6 is conclusions.
Investment under regulation
One of the most important challenges of energy sector regulators is to ensure adequate and efficient level of investments in the electricity networks. This need arises from the principle problem of asymmetric information between the regulator and the regulated firm. Therefore, important variations among the regulatory frameworks stem from different perspectives on treatment of investments. Other controllable costs such as operating costs tend to be less critical as there is a consensus that these need to be minimised for a given level of output and service quality. However, due to the dynamic and long term nature of investments, minimisation of capital expenditures may not be possible or desirable. This is because underinvestment may endanger long term reliability of networks with significant socioeconomic costs.
Within this context, the challenge of regulation is to strike a balance between adequate return on capital, incentive for investment, and prevention of under-and over-investment. Rate of return and incentive regulations both can lead to underinvestment or overinvestment. For example, rate of return regulation, as a subsidiary of cost plus regimes, guarantees a fair return on capital though it raises the risk of overinvestment or inefficiency (Averch and Johnson, 1962) . On the other hand, price (or revenue) cap incentive regulation restrains the revenues of the firm and promotes cost savings, though it might raise the risk of underinvestment and quality of service deterioration especially when targeted incentives are not implemented or not strong enough (Jamasb et al., 2012; Liston, 1993) .
In response to the above issues, regulators have adopted different models in order to address the issue of investment under regulation. Broadly, the regulatory treatment of investments can be viewed in terms of two main approaches: ex-ante and ex-post review of capital costs (Petrov et al., 2010) .
Ex-ante review of investment expenditure
Under the ex-ante model of investment treatment, regulated companies submit their business plans for expected capital expenditures prior to the commencement of the next regulatory period. The regulator scrutinises the submitted plan to verify prudence of investments. As there is asymmetric information between the regulator and the firm, the former relies on engineering reports, auditing, and cost-benefit analysis for the need case and efficiency of investments. Thus, the regulator needs to form an opinion, a priori, on the prudent level and type of investments required in the following regulatory period. At the end of the regulatory period, the regulator evaluates deviations of actual investments from the investment plans and may disallow, partially or totally, the excess investments. Likewise, in the case of downward deviation from projected investments, the regulator might reward the firm. This is the case in the UK under the RIIO-ED1 model where distribution networks receive financial incentive if they deliver the same output with less investment (Ofgem, 2012) . Under this condition, regulator can lower the allowed revenue in the next regulatory period in order to better align the network's actual cost with their revenue and share the benefits of cost reduction with consumers.
The ex-ante method of treating investments aims to secure adequate investment and quality of supply. This method of treating investments has been adopted under rate of return regulation and incentive regulations that are based on projected cost and not on historical costs. However, the impact on investments can be different depending on the regulatory model as, for example, rate of return regulation increases observable investments, whereas price cap regime promotes cost reducing investments (Armstrong and Sappington, 2005) . Under the condition of guaranteed return, the utilities bear little risk for their investments. This makes it easier to compete in the capital market with non-regulated firms in order to finance their investments.
The disadvantage of the ex-ante method is that companies have incentive to inflate the capital cost by reporting high volume of work or by capitalising their operational expenditure when there is no incentive attached to downward deviation from the agreed level of capital expenditures in the plan. This is because the company knows that lower investment lead to lower regulatory asset base (RAB) and consequently lower return. Also, as argued in Besanko and Spulber (1992) , firms might choose a higher than optimal level of capital in order to persuade the regulator to allow higher operating costs and price on their product. Furthermore, Averch and Johnson (1962) showed that under this model, more capital will be employed by the regulated firm compared to a non-regulated firm, given any level of output, especially when the regulator commits to a higher rate of return in advance.
Since the formal presentation of Averch-Johnson effect, several methods have been proposed to overcome this issue. Gilbert and Newberry (1988) show that an approach based on "used and useful" rate-of-return regulation, applied strategically in an infinitely repeated game, can remedy the effect. The other suggested approach to alleviate the Averch-Johnson bias is that the regulator should offer a nonlinear rate-of-return in which return is decreasing in capital (Kle-vorick, 1966; Baumol and Klevorick, 1970) . A counterargument states that while the proposed approach might be optimal to help the regulator observe the capital costs of firms however, it does not reduce the firm's incentive to inflate capital spending. Furthermore, the capital expenditure bias can also distort operating and maintenance cost of regulated firm (Petrov et al., 2010) .
Investment behaviour of firms under these regimes also depends on other factors such as regulatory commitment and the ability of the regulator to disallow costs after investment. Cost disallowance is an effective instrument to move towards an equilibrium path when the regulator identifies undue investments. Lyon and Mayo (2005) demonstrate that the empirical consequence of large scale cost disallowance is a reduction in propensity to invest for the firms that have experienced such disallowances. Cost disallowances also direct the firms towards cautious small scale investments. Teisberg (1993) argues that under stringent cost disallowance, firms incline more towards smaller projects in order to reduce the chance of being penalised in regulatory process. Moreover, unlike larger projects that are prone to change in economic conditions; the short lead time of implementation does not change the -usefulness‖ of project from initial expectation.
On the other hand, asymmetric profit and loss restrictions may cause delay in investments. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) note that under regulatory uncertainty, delaying investments may be beneficial even though a project might indeed cover its capital costs. There are also instances that uncertainty my lead to reduction in investment. Kinnunen (2006) asserts that lower investments level of Finnish distribution network companies relative to before liberalisation may be related to regulatory uncertainty about the future developments.
Ex-post review of capital expenditure
An alternative regulatory option to treat investments is the ex-post review of capital expenditures. In this method, the regulator does not need to form an opinion, a priori, on the type and scale of investments needed in the next regulatory period such that there is no need to project these. The regulator uses the sum of all the costs incurred to the company (operational and capital expenditures, and other controllable costs) to construct a single variable that reflects the total costs. The total expenditure is then benchmarked against peer companies in each regulatory review period using frontier based benchmarking methods such as COLS, DEA, or SFA 2 (Petrov et al., 2010) . Thus, the regulator does not interfere with the detail of investment plans and the companies decide whether or not undertake a particular investment or what level of capital expenditure is needed. It is expected that companies will restrain their investments to the efficient levels, in order to avoid high costs in the benchmarking process. Under this method the regulatory period is normally shorter to dissuade investment inefficiency.
There are several drawbacks in ex-post regulatory treatment of investments through benchmarking total costs. Firstly, benchmarking does not identify an absolute measure of efficiency and only estimates the relative efficiency ranking of the firms. This can lead to penalising efficient investment or rewarding inefficient investments (Poudineh and Jamasb, 2013) . Secondly, it forces firms to trade-off between capital expenditures (Capex) and operating expenditures (Opex) to avoid revenue loss when there is fear of cost disallowance. Thirdly, the outcome of benchmarking is dependent on the quality of data, robustness of the methodology used and sample size. A slight change in these will result in outcomes with severe consequences for the revenue of the firms. Fourthly, benchmarking does not distinguish between investments to replace existing assets and new investments aimed at upgrading the network as well as between capital and operating expenditure as they serve different purposes with different time scales. However, Burn and Riechmann (2004) argue that there should be an identical treatment of Capex and Opex because benchmarking only one cost category such as Opex (currently practised in the UK) and different treatment of Capex creates incentive for companies to transfer costs from the ‗yardstick' category to the ‗firm specific' category. The counterargument is that inclusion of investment costs in the benchmarking model might create a virtual inefficiency that persists over time and adversely affects the revenue of firm.
The regulator can use other instruments to ensure sufficient investment such as setting quality performance standards or quality incentive instruments. These instruments include setting a performance target based on some estimated index of reliability such as SAIDI and SAIFI 3 (often used in ex-ante model of investment treatment) or including the cost of energy not supplied and cost of network energy losses in total benchmarked cost (often used in ex-post model). This is to ensure no systematic underinvestment occurs that endangers security or quality of energy supply.
The ownership model is among the debated issues that whether or not have an effect on the investment behaviour of regulated firms. While the conventional economic intuition is that public ownership leads to overinvestment, von Hirschhausen et al. (2004) argue that one of the reasons behind the privatisation at the end of 1980s was the inability of the public sector to raise the necessary funds for investment and hence there was risk of underinvestment. They argue that ownership itself does not seem to have a direct impact on investment behaviour whereas the model of regulatory framework matters more.
Investment under Norwegian regulatory regime
In the Norwegian regulatory regime, incentives for investment are provided through a combination of ‗direct' and ‗economic' instruments. The direct instruments (reflected in Norwegian Energy Act) oblige utilities to connect new consumers and generation sources and provide high level of power quality. In order to meet these requirements, companies need to carry out sufficient investments. On the other hand, network companies will receive a reasonable return (minimum 2%) on their investment given effective management and utilisation of network. Any company that falls short of minimum return will receive compensation at the end of regulatory period.
The Norwegian incentive regulation model treats investment in an ex-post manner. It has both the elements of cost efficiency incentive and yardstick regulation. Under this regime investments are restrained indirectly such that overcapitalisation can lead to deviation from efficient frontier and consequently partial disallowance of investment costs. The revenue ( ) is capped using Equation 1, which in essence represents the trade-off between cost reduction and rent transfer to the consumer, given the asymmetric information between firm and regulator (Poudineh and Jamasb 2013, Newbery, 2002; Joskow, 2005) .
(1)
Where, denotes actual costs of firm including operating, capital, depreciations and maintenance costs as well as the cost of network energy losses and energy not supplied (CENS). The regulator also deducts the CENS from the firms' revenue 4 and adjusts the allowed revenue for tax and other non-controllable expenses. is the norm cost obtained by using frontier-based benchmarking method 5 , and is the power of incentive in terms of the weight given to cost benchmarking vs. actual costs in setting the allowed revenue. The share of actual costs and norm costs in determining the revenue cap is currently 40 and 60% respectively (i.e. ). The regulator places more weight on the norm cost to encourage firms move towards efficient frontier as close as possible.
Although ex-post regulatory treatment of investment tends to be less interventionist, there is a possibility of dispute between the firm and regulator following investment. Moreover, investments are long term undertakings while benchmarking only captures the short run behaviour of network companies. Under this condition, relying only on ex-post review of investment expenditure might result in unintended consequences for the consumers and society as a whole. Therefore, a better approach might lies in combining ex-post with ex-ante regulatory model of investment treatment. Having investment determinants in hand, it is rather more reliable to project investment over the next regulatory review and compare these results with the benchmarking outcome and actual behaviour of firms. This can probably lead to more efficient investments and reduces frequency of arbitration between firm and regulator.
At the same time, an ex-ante regulatory model is based on a fixed capital investment projection whereas network companies operate in a dynamic environment where technology, regulatory standards, demand and economic conditions are constantly changing. Thus, when the length of regulatory period is relatively high the fundamental factors are prone to change between two regulatory periods. For example, there might be an unexpected rise in load demand in a particular geographic region which raises the possibility of the need for unanticipated investments. Under this situation, the investment by companies will not be recovered until the next regulatory period, hence; the firm is exposed to financial constraints. This problem of ex-ante regulatory model can be alleviated by linking the firms' allowed revenue to some of the primary investment drivers of distribution companies obtained from investment analysis. Therefore, irrespective of pros and cons for ex-post and ex-ante regulatory models; identifying the key investment determinants can help to improve regulatory treatment of investment under incentive regulation.
Methodology
Contrary to regulated industries, the investment behaviour of firms in a competitive market is among the most studied areas of economics (Jorgenson, 1967) . In a regulated environment, the factors that influence investment decision of the firms are not straightforward especially when they are subject to a combination of incentives. This is because regulated firms can be heterogeneous or behave differently in response to incentives. Thus, due to the uncertainty around the response of the firm to different incentive instruments we use a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) technique.
BMA is a powerful tool to examine the extent to which inclusion of a given factor improves the explanatory power of estimated models. The literature on the application of the Bayesian approach to investment analysis of electric utilities is limited but not new. Egert (2009) uses BMA to explore the effect of macro-factors such as joint introduction of independent regulator and incentive regulation on sector level investments. Peck (1974) employs a Bayesian method in order to investigate the association between return to scale characteristic and lumpy investments. He compares this with the result of a distributed lag model that complies with the smooth investment behaviour. In the present study we use BMA to examine possible factors that constitute firm level determinants of investments under incentive regulation.
BMA estimates the parameters of interest conditional on each model in the model space and then computes the unconditional estimates based on weighted average of these conditional estimates. The model averaging estimator takes into account the uncertainties around model selection and estimation whereas conventional estimators are based upon preliminary diagnostic tests. Hence, BMA provides a more robust method of inference on regression parameters. This is particularly relevant in the context of regulated networks where the regulator needs to take into account the shortcomings and revenue implications of using a specific model for a relatively heterogeneous set of networks. Hence, a practical approach by regulators to model selection can be to use the average of competing models (Jamasb et al., 2004) .
The model space for a BMA estimator can be represented as in (2) (see De Luca and Magnus, 2011; Magnus et al., 2010) . (2) where is vector of dependent variable observations, is matrix of explanatory variables and, is an vector of error term that its elements are identically and independently distributed. As there are regressors the number of possible models to be considered is . Therefore, the model in the model space (model ) is achieved by inclusion of a subset of ( regressors and can be written as:
where is an matrix of observations for the included subset of regressors, is the associated sub-vector of parameters and is the new error term after regressors are excluded. Prior beliefs on the model space are introduced by assuming that each model is weighted by its posterior probability as in (4).
where is the prior probability of model and | is the marginal likelihood of given model . The estimator combines the prior belief on the known elements of model with the extra information coming from the data. The key elements include the sample likelihood function, the prior distribution on the regression parameters of model and the prior distribution on the model space.
The posterior model probability (PMPs) and thus the model weighted posterior distribution for any parameter such as can be presented as in (5).
Under the condition of no prior knowledge, a common choice of prior, can be to assign the uniform probability to each model. Following -Zellener's g prior‖ instruction, it is assumed that there is a normal distribution for each model. Also, we choose a ‗‗non-informative'' improper prior on the common intercept and error variance by assuming they are evenly distributed over their domain ( (Zeugner, 2011) . Moreover, since we do not know about the coefficients a priori, a common assumption is normal distribution with mean zero and a specified variance. Thus, according to Zellner's g the distribution of coefficients can be presented as in (6).
The hyper parameter shows the extent to which one is certain that the coefficients are zero. The posterior mean for is a weighted average of the posterior means in each model as follows:
The posterior distribution of coefficient also reflects the prior uncertainty and given it follows a t-distribution with the expected value of | ̂ . In a similar manner the posterior variance is also influenced by as follows:
where ̅ is the mean of the dependent variable, is the number of observations and is the conventional R-squared for each model . Considering this framework, we can write the marginal likelihood | with proportionality constant that is the same for all models, as in (9).
where is the size penalty factor adjusting for model size and | is probability of prior g which could depend on . Popular value for the choice of is to allocate for all models and thus assign the same information to the prior as it is contained in one observation (Ley and Steel, 2012) . The detailed technical discussion of BMA estimator can be found in Hoeting et al. (1999) .
Choice of model size prior
Following Zeugner (2011) and Amini and Parmeter (2011) we use three different priors for model size distribution in order to reduce the possibility of result bias from choosing a particular prior. These include, uniform prior, fixed prior and random prior. The uniform prior is to assign a common probability of to all models, considering combinations of different models ( is the total number of explanatory variables). As this distribution has a mean of hence; we expect the mass of distribution concentrates around a model of size , simply because the combination of ( ) is higher than other possible combinations.
The fixed prior is a binomial distribution which the probability of prior model size presented as the multiplication of inclusion and exclusion probabilities as shown in (10).
As the average model size under this condition would be so if we specify the expected value of model size distribution, then the value of becomes automatically clear. Choosing an expected model size of will convert it to previous case of uniform distribution. Thus, in order to reflect prior uncertainty we need to specify a lower than average expected model size (we choose because the number of regressors in our case is 18 and consequently the average model size is 9). This pushes the distribution towards a smaller model size.
Finally, we adopt random prior in order to highly incorporate uncertainty and make the result as robust as possible to the prior selection. This is indeed the same binomial distribution however, following Ley and Steel (2009) a hyper prior is imposed on by drawing it from a Beta distribution. The resulting prior is less tight around the average model size and it reduces unintended outcome because of choice prior by decreasing the importance of prior in estimation procedure.
Data
The dataset used in this analysis is an unbalanced panel of 126 distribution companies from 2004 to 2010. All financial variables are presented in real terms and adjusted based on 2010 prices. There are thirteen independent regressors that constitute 18 factors by including two lags and three interaction terms. The rationale behind these factors, as potential investment drivers, has been based on the Norwegian regulatory model, technical characteristics of grid and previous studies of distribution networks. Overall, the factors that might affect investment behaviour of distribution companies can be categorised into four groups.
The first group comprises demand driven factors such as number of customers, number of leisure homes 6 , number of transformers (stations) 7 , distributed generation and energy density.
An increase in demand for energy will cause the network companies to raise the number of distribution feeders or to upgrade the capacity of transformers which in both cases leads to capital investment. Distributed generation is a potential investment driver as it may require initial grid reinforcement for integration of these resources (Mendez et al., 2006) . Energy density as the measure of energy delivered per unit of network length (Km) can be an investment driver as well. This is because, considering the geographic dispersion of load centres in Norway, energy density is a more important factor than the length of networks or energy distributed. There are some sparse areas towards the north with wider distribution networks (i.e. higher network length but lower energy density) whereas energy density is much higher in southern populated areas.
The second group is service quality driven factors, such as the cost of energy not supplied ( ) and cost of network energy loss and their lags. is calculated based on the minutes of interruption times consumer willingness to pay for reliable service 8 . is then computed by multiplication of technical loss of the network and annual average system price. The lags of these variables are included to account for preventive investments in addition to corrective investments to reduce energy losses and interruptions (Jamasb et al. 2012) . and related incentives are embedded in Norwegian regulation in order to encourage the network companies to maintain a high quality of supply. It is expected that threat of financial loss as a result of poor quality of service will encourage firms to undertake investment.
The third group constitutes of environmental driven factors such as snow, wind and distance to coast, and forest productivity 9 . Weather factors can affect the quality of service of network utilities and are therefore potential cost drivers (Yu et al., 2009) . Also, we calculate the share of overhead lines with respect to total length of network for each distribution network and 6 We separated leisure homes from conventional residential and commercial consumers as they have a different load profile which peaks over the weekends and zero in other days. 7 Network station or substation is the point that high voltage transmission grid connects to distribution network. 8 Consumer willingness to pay is computed using costumer surveys and technical information. 9 These variables are: (1) snow conditions, in millimeters of snow per year at a given temperature (around 0 degrees C), (2) wind and distance to coast, as a ratio (average extreme wind/distance to coast), and (3) forest productivity, a number between 0 and 1 showing the share of forest with this growth rate along the power lines.
then compute interaction of geographic and weather variables with overhead lines to allow for possibility of environmental driven investments aimed at protection of overhead lines.
The forth category is related to other factors such as asset depreciation and operational expenditures. We expect depreciation of assets to be a main driver of reinvestments in the networks. Also, since the Norwegian distribution network companies operate under ex-post review of investment using total cost benchmarking, we consider the possibility of a trade-off between capital expenditures and operational costs (Poudineh and Jamasb, 2013) . Table 1 presents the summary of descriptive statistics of the variables. 
Results and discussions
Long-term planning and asset management are among the main priorities of distribution network companies. Investments in network companies are costly, long-lasting and irreversible. Hence, better information in decision process is of essential importance to the both companies and regulators. This, in turn, relies on understanding and identifying the factors that drive long term investment of distribution grid. Table 2 presents the results of investment models estimated, based on different priors, (explained in Section 3) for the Norwegian distribution companies. The dependent variable is logarithm of the investments. For each prior and estimation two statistics are reported -i.e. posterior inclusion probability (PIP) and posterior mean of coefficient for all models even those where the variable is not included (i.e. its coefficient is zero). PIP shows the importance of variable in explaining the investment behaviour of companies. It is also the sum of all Posterior Model Probabilities (PMP) wherein that particular variable is included.
As shown in Table 2 , for the case of uniform prior, depreciation has a PIP of 100%. This means out of different models that have been estimated using uniform prior, almost all of them include depreciation. Moreover, it has the highest coefficient in terms of magnitude and shows the expected sign. Thus, depreciation of assets seems to be the most important driver of investments under this prior. This also, complies with the intuition that reinvestment in networks is mainly derived by the rate of depreciation of assets. Furthermore, the main responsibility of the distribution network operator (DNO) is to keep the network reliable and safe by replacing faulted and non-functional devices and equipment.
The number of recreational homes ( ) which are part of customers (however, with a different load profile) also indicates high PIP. These are homes that are only used during the holidays and weekends. Although the magnitude of the coefficient is relatively low; it is the only customer driven investment during the studied period. Energy density ( ) and number of network stations ( ) show high PIP of 91% based on the fixed prior. Number of stations has the second highest coefficient after depreciation and energy density has the third highest. This indicates that they both belong to the model and are investment drivers with high certainty. Network stations are the place that step down transformer is located and projection of demand growth often necessitates the upgrade and/or capacity enhancement of existing transformers. These are capital intensive and likely the reason that the coefficient of is higher than . The energy density, on the other hand, is a measure that indicates rate of load intensity in a particular network. Norway, due its specific location of load centres in south and production areas in other places, has a relatively wide range of energy densities. An increase in utilisation of existing capital will increase energy density and leads to investments to support the flow of power.
Power quality indicators are among the factors that are expected to have an impact on investment as the Norwegian regulator penalises for poor quality of supply. As shown in Table 1 , the cost of energy not supplied ( ) has a high posterior inclusion probability of 86% and a fairly low coefficient. This indicates that although improving quality is costly it is not as capital intensive as other investment drivers. On the other hand, cost of network energy loss (
) and the two lagged variables do not show any significance. This suggests that investment by network companies mainly responds to interruptions and outages in the current period. That is investments to reduce interruption have mainly been of a corrective nature rather than a preventive nature. In the case of insignificant , it may also signal that reductions of network energy losses does not justify the investments because the incentive for energy loss improvement has not been strong enough. This is because Norwegian regulator treats cost of network energy loss and cost of interruptions ( ) differently. Both and are part of controllable costs that are included in benchmarking model. However, is also subtracted directly from the firm's allowed revenue in the final stage of revenue setting thus leading to stronger incentive to reduce service interruptions.
Additionally, the regulator evaluates the network energy losses at system price whereas energy not served is evaluated at -consumer willingness to pay for reliable services‖. As the costs of outages are higher to the residential, commercial and industrial users than the system price, network companies have more incentive to avoid interruption costs which probably more affect their revenue.
The results indicate that only a few factors drive most of the investments of the Norwegian distribution companies. For example, there is no evidence of environmental driven investments as none of these variables and their interaction terms with overhead lines show any significance. This might be related to the small diversity of weather conditions over time and across country. At the same time, environmental factors might drive the operating costs as they are usually used in benchmarking models to capture the heterogeneity in the operating environment of firms (Poudineh and Jamasb, 2013) . Operational expenditure is negatively correlated with investment but it has hardly any impact on the investment at the sector level. Therefore, we can ensure that investment drivers of distribution networks are mainly the five factors discussed in the above. This is also reflected in Figure 1 .
The first figure presents the posterior model size distribution based on the uniform prior. As seen from the figure and discussed previously in Section 3, the mean of prior is 9. However, the posterior distribution of model size has a mean of 5.4. This clearly indicates that only around five factors are of significant importance under uniform prior. In Bayesian parlance we have updated our prior belief about investment drivers through new information coming from the data. Moving away from uniform prior to the fixed prior based on binomial distribution of prior, it can be seen from Table 2 , that there is not a significant change in the results. Although the PIPs have changed slightly due to the choice of different prior, the same five factors still have significant posterior inclusion probabilities. This can be seen from Figure 2 that shows a posterior mean of model size distribution of around 5.
It is likely that the most robust results stem from the random prior estimation. As seen from Table 2 , under the random prior the principal factors are exactly the same as the other two estimations but show slightly lower coefficients. Furthermore, there is a small reduction in the PIPs for the main factors but they are still very high. Figure 3 illustrates the posterior distribution and expected mode size for the random prior. As seen, the prior distribution places more emphasis on very low model sizes although the posterior average model size is still around 5. This confirms that the results are not biased with the choice of prior. and with a posterior model probability (PMP) of 37, 43, and 43% for uniform, fixed and random prior respectively. Considering the huge number of possible models these constitute rather high probabilities. The second and third best models include operating costs and exclude and in some cases. However, as seen from the Table 3 the posterior probability of these models are very low to be true. As it is discernible we have investigated the effect of 18 factors which are categorised under four groups, on investment behaviour of Norwegian distribution companies. Figure 4 summarises the impact of all factors across all models. A seen, there are two sets of variables in the figure: those that are located in the far upper left with highest PIP and those that are placed in lower right and associated with lowest PIP. None of the investment determinants has a PIP of below 60%.
There are three investment drivers from the demand group. Those include the number of network stations, number of recreational facilities and energy density. From service quality factors, only the cost of energy not supplied has an impact on capital expenditure. Depreciation is the only other factor that drives the investments. Moreover, as shown in Figure 4 , distributed generation does not appear as an investment driver which, at first, seems counterintuitive. However, one explanation is that the Norwegian networks have already adapted to integrate the distributed generation resources. For example, the share of the dispersed hydroelectric plants accounted for around 95.1% of the total net generation in 2009 (NVE, 2011).
Figure 4: Comparison across models for the most important factors
In addition, although Norway is located in the cold region with severe weather conditions over the large parts of year however; there is no evidence of environmental driven investment. This is while overhead distribution lines are usually vulnerable to the effect of weather condition. The apparent lack of significance of environmental factors might be caused by a small diversity of weather conditions across the country. The other explanation could be that environmental factors are already incorporate in the design and operation of networks and this reduces the need for subsequent reinforcement against severe weather conditions.
Conclusions
Achieving sufficient and efficient investments in capital intensive electricity networks is an important challenge for sector regulators. Over the coming years the need for significant level of investment is envisaged, in distribution networks, in order to meet new challenges of the power sector such as integration of dispersed and variable renewable resources, enabling demand side participation, and adoption of new technologies such as roll out of smart meters and deployment of smart grids. Thus, understanding the drivers of these investments can help to have more accurate projections of capital expenditures which enable the sector regulators to more effectively address the issue of adequate and appropriate investments through incentive regulation.
This study investigated the determinants of investments in Norwegian electricity distribution companies using a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach that provides a coherent method of inference on regression coefficient by taking into account the uncertainties around model selection and estimation. This is particularly relevant in the context of regulated industries where the regulator needs to recognise the shortcomings of choosing a single model. The estimations were based on three different priors in order to avoid bias in the findings as a result of selecting a particular prior.
The results indicate that, out of the 18 different potential factors explored, five factors constitute the main determinants of investments in Norwegian electricity distribution networks. Depreciation is the most important factor and constantly shows a 100% posterior inclusion probability regardless of the choice of prior. The number of leisure homes, number of network stations, energy density, and cost of energy not supplied are other main drivers of investments. We find little evidence of environmental factors driving investments though we expect network reinforcements to improve protection against severe weather condition. The apparent lack of significance of environmental factors is likely related to small diversity of weather condition across the country. Moreover, we find no investment effect from distributed generation sources connected to the low voltage distribution grid. This is likely due to the fact that Norwegian distribution grids are already well adapted and accommodated large numbers of dispersed hydroelectric resources.
The identified determinants of investments can play a pivotal role in helping to achieve investment sufficiency and efficiency given the issues with ex-post regulatory treatment of capital expenditures using, for example, total cost benchmarking. Thus, a more conservative approach could consist of a combination of ex-ante with ex-post review of investment expenditure to reduce frequency of arbitration and benchmarking model related biases. Moreover, as the economic factors are prone to change between long regulatory periods; the process of cost recovery will improve if the allowed revenues of the network companies are more directly linked to the principal investment drivers such as energy density or number of customers.
